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TEXAS SHOULD ADOPT THE UNIFORM
ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS ACT: A
COMPREHENSIVE STATUTE TO ELIMINATE
THE TECHNICAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
STATE MORTGAGE LAW AND SECURE
LENDERS' ACCESS TO PLEDGED RENTS
Amanda L. Burcham*
INTRODUCTION
HE commercial real estate market is driven not only by the value
of land and improvements, but also the income-usually rents-a
building or project produces.' For lending institutions that finance
such developments, the project "provid[es] two separate and distinct
sources of security for the [debt] obligation": the property itself and the
rents. 2 Mortgagees, 3 therefore, take a lien on the physical property
through a mortgage, or deed of trust, as well as a separate lien on rents
through an "assignment of rents and leases" (assignment of rents). The
rental stream provides lenders additional security for the mortgage loan
because in many jurisdictions, including Texas, a mortgagee would not
otherwise be entitled to collect rents until foreclosure. 4 An assignment of
rents, however, allows a mortgagee to collect and control rents when a
loan obligation is in default so that the mortgagor cannot ignore his
lender and collect the rents. Such pocketing of funds by mortgagors in
* J.D. Candidate 2008, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.A. History with Honors,
2005, Vanderbilt University. Special thanks to Julia P. Forrester for her guidance and
encouragement.
1. In re Allen, 357 B.R. 103, 117 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (stating the "almost univer-
sal rule" that "if an [income-producing] asset is separated from the income stream it pro-
duces, two assets may be created, and that the value of each can be separately computed.
But the sum of the two values is almost always the same as the value of the asset before its
income stream was separated"); GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
TRANSFER, FINANCE, & DEVELOPMENT: CASES & MATERIALS 1166 (7th ed. 2006) [herein-
after NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, & DEVELOPMENT].
2. 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 4.35
(3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW].
3. This comment uses the terms "mortgage" and "deed of trust" interchangeably. In
addition, "mortgagee" or "lender" describes the beneficiary under a deed of trust whereas
"mortgagor" or "borrower" describes the trustor under a deed of trust.
4. FDIC v. Int'l Prop. Mgmt., 929 F.2d 1033, 1034 (5th Cir. 1991). See infra text
accompanying notes 23-26.
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arrears is commonly referred to as "milking" the rents.5
Security interests in rents are enforceable in every state and are regu-
lated by state real property law rather than Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which generally governs security interests in
personal property.6 Section 9-104(10) of the U.C.C. expressly "excludes
from Article 9's scope any transaction intended to create a security inter-
est in real estate."'7 Given that state property law controls, lenders and
borrowers are subject to rules that vary from state to state when prepar-
ing and later enforcing their loan agreements. 8 To complicate matters, a
mortgagor on arrears in his loan payments is experiencing financial
trouble and is therefore more likely to file for bankruptcy. 9 In fact, bank-
ruptcy is often seen as a refuge for debtors from creditors seeking to col-
lect. 10 The problematic enforcement of security interests in rents is
emphasized by the "massive amount of litigation" in federal bankruptcy
courts on this subject and, unfortunately, such courts' inconsistent
judgments."
Despite the utility and thus frequent use of assignments of rents, Texas
lenders face difficulties in realizing upon the pledged asset, both generally
and in the context of federal bankruptcy proceedings because of their
state law's technical construction of these securities. The Uniform As-
signment of Rents Act ("UARA" or the "Act"), promulgated by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July
2005,12 addresses the "'problem areas' of litigation regarding assignments
of rents" and offers clarification. 13 The reporter for the new UARA, R.
5. Uniform Assignment of Rents Act (UARA) § 14 cmt. 1 (2005), available at http://
www.nccusl.org (follow "Final Acts and Legislation" hyperlink, then choose "Assignment
of Rents Act" from dropdown menu).
6. See id. at Prefatory Note; Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55-57 (1979) (hold-
ing that the existence of security interest must be resolved by reference to state law even if
unperfected at the time the mortgagor files bankruptcy); In re Vill. Props., Ltd., 723 F.2d
441, 443 (5th Cir. 1984); NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, & DE-
VELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 357. In addition, state law governs the effect of perfection or
non-perfection as to the priority of a security interest among a debtor's common creditors.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE A"N. § 9.301 (Vernon 2005).
7. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues, Rents, and Formalism in the Bank-
ruptcy Courts: Implications for Reforming Commercial Real Estate Finance, 40 UCLA L.
REV. 1461, 1470 (1993) [hereinafter Freyermuth, Hotel Revenues, Rents, and Formalism].
8. UARA, Prefatory Note; R. Wilson Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents:
The New Uniform Assignment of Rents Act, 71 Mo. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) [hereinafter
Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents]; Julia P. Forrester, A Uniform and More Ra-
tional Approach to Rents as Security for the Mortgage Loan, 46 RuTGERS L. REV. 349,
352-55 (1993) [hereinafter Forrester, Rational Approach].
9. See UARA, Prefatory Note; see Forrester, Rational Approach, supra note 8, at
354-55.
10. Comment, Mortgagee's Right to Rents after Default, 50 YALE L.J. 1424, 1424
(1941).
11. Forrester, Rational Approach, supra note 8, at 354.
12. See UARA.
13. Memorandum from Edward F. Lowry, Jr., Chair, Study Comm. on Mortgagee Ac-
cess to Rents from Income-Producing Land to the Comm. on Scope and Program, Nat'l
Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws (July 23, 2003) (on file with Biddle Law Li-
brary, University of Pennsylvania).
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Wilson Freyermuth,'14 encourages its adoption by states such as Texas
"that presently lack comprehensive statutes governing security interests
in rents.' 15
The purpose of this comment is to emphasize multiple sections of the
UARA and offer a careful analysis of the positive changes to Texas law
should Texas adopt the UARA. Part I chronicles Texas's treatment of
security interests in rents, given that mortgagors retain rights to posses-
sion, use, and rents until foreclosure, unless the loan documents state oth-
erwise. Part II discusses the divergent enforcement requirements
governing the assignment of rents in Texas because, as explained in Part
I, Texas courts recognize two types of assignments. Indeed, lenders in
Texas face opposition as courts refuse to give effect to rental assignments.
Part III then explains the difficulties federal bankruptcy courts face when
determining lenders' rights to post-petition rents. Problems arise when
those courts apply Texas property law in concert with Bankruptcy Code
provisions which limit creditors' ability to reach a debtor's assets accruing
subsequent to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. This section eluci-
dates issues of enforcement, or "perfection," of security interests in rents.
Lastly, Part IV explains the policy arguments behind the text of the new
UARA, in contradistinction to Texas judicial policy, and thus the impact
the Act would have on Texas law governing the assignment of rents.
Overall, Texas should adopt the Act to simplify its law governing the as-
signment of rents. The Act would grant lenders greater flexibility by
making non-judicial remedies available to realize upon pledged rentals
after default, as contemplated by the average commercial real estate loan
agreement.
I. CREATION OF A SECURITY INTEREST IN RENTS
A. TEXAS-A LIEN THEORY STATE
When English courts first developed the common law mortgage, a bor-
rower conveyed in fee simple to his lender subject to the condition subse-
quent that title would be returned upon repayment of the debt;' 6 the
mortgagee received all "incidents of legal title" such as right of possession
and use, right to rents, eminent domain proceeds, and, in the event of
14. For over two decades, Professor Wilson Freyermuth and others have attempted to
standardize the law governing security interests in rents. See, e.g., Julia P. Forrester, Still
Crazy After All These Years: The Absolute Assignment of Rents in Mortgage Loan Trans-
actions, 59 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming July 2007), available at http://law.bepress.com/ex-
presso/eps/1817 at 104, 104 n.12 (follow "Download the Paper" hyperlink) [hereinafter
Forrester, Still Crazy].
15. Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents, supra note 8, at 4. In addition, Profes-
sor Julia P. Forrester considers the particular "havoc" absolute assignments of rents create
in commercial real estate loans; Forrester recommends that all state legislatures adopt the
UARA because it "removes the necessity for absolute assignments of rents by creating a
workable and comprehensive scheme for the creation of security interests in rents." For-
rester, Still Crazy, supra note 14, at 101.
16. NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 6-7;
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Atwood, 244 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex. 1951).
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lender's death, the land went to its devisees or heirs.17 Over time the law
changed so that a borrower retained possession but was required to col-
lect and apply rents to the mortgage debt. 18 Similar to the English com-
mon law mortgage, American courts initially adopted the same "title"
theory of mortgage law. 19 Today, only a minority of American jurisdic-
tions have retained the title theory; the majority, instead, have adopted
the "lien" theory of mortgage law.20 At present, thirty-two states have
adopted the lien theory of mortgages, 21 including Texas. 22
Under the lien theory, a mortgagee acquires only a lien on the real
property and has no right to possession, rents, or profits. 23 The mortga-
gor, on the other hand, retains both legal and equitable title, enjoying the
rights of possession,24 use, and rents until foreclosure.25 Despite lien the-
ory mortgage rules, the assignment of rents allows lenders to collect rents
without necessarily foreclosing on the property, or at least allows lenders
to apply rents after default, but prior to foreclosure.26
B. COLLATERAL AND ABSOLUTE ASSIGNMENTS OF RENTS
As suggested above, borrowers and lenders in Texas may freely con-
tract around the operation of lien theory rules and draft an assignment of
rents to give lendes. rights as to rents prior to foreclosure as further se-
curity for the. mortgage. In- fact. Texas recognizes two distinct types of
assignments of rents.27 As a matter of public policy, Texas courts favor
construing assignment of rents clauses is creating a security interest in
rents, an inchoate lien, to serve as additional security for the mortgage
17. NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 6-7;
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 244 S.W.2d at 639 ("Originally, possession passed by livery of
seizin [sic] to the mortgagee.").
18. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 244 S.W.2d at 639 (noting that Chancery court "declared it
unreasonable that [the mortgagee] should retain for his own benefit what was intended as a
mere security.").
19. Memorandum from Edward F. Lowry, Jr., supra note 13, at pt. I.
20. Id.
21. NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 1, at 345 n.i. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1(a)
(1997) ("A mortgage creates only a security interest in real estate and confers no right to
possession of that real estate on the mortgagee.").
22. Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex. 1981); Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 244
S.W.2d at 640 (discussing the development of Texas mortgage law); Willis v. Moore, 59 Tex.
628, 1883 WL 9242, at *5 (Tex. 1883).
23. FDIC v. Int'l Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1034 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying
Texas law); see Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 593; Oryx Energy Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank of Tex.,
895 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied).
24. Willis, 1883 WL 9242, at *5. See NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE
LAW, supra note 2, § 4.22, at 211-12.
25. See Forrester, Rational Approach, supra note 8, at 358-59.
26. Forrester, Rational Approach, supra note 8, at 350. Under the "title" theory-
historically the majority rule-there was no need for the mortgagee to take a separate
assignment of rents because the mortgagee had legal title to the real property, which in-
cluded the right to collect rents. See In re Millette, 186 F.3d 638, 644 n.10 (5th Cir. 1999).
27. Cadle Co. v. Collin Creek Phase II Assocs., 998 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1999, no pet.); Oryx Energy Co., 895 S.W.2d at 414-15.
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debt.28 This first type is called a "collateral" assignment.2 9 As will be
discussed in Part II, enforcement of a collateral assignment under Texas
property law requires additional measures beyond the original execution
and recordation of the agreement precisely because it is an "inchoate," or
not yet activated, interest.30 The second and disfavored type of assign-
ment of rents automatically and immediately conveys absolute title to
rents to the mortgagee; this is called an "absolute" assignment of rents.3 1
In contrast to a collateral assignment, an absolute assignment is "already
'activated' upon execution and delivery" of the document. 32 Moreover,
"[a]n absolute assignment of rents is not [a] security," but rather will ef-
fectively discharge the debt by the sum total of rents collected. 33 Despite
its technical form, an absolute assignment is effectually equivalent to a
collateral assignment because it is typically "subject to a condition prece-
dent that it shall become effective upon default by the mortgagor. ' 34 As-
signment of rents clauses, therefore, are generally drafted to allow a
borrower to collect rents until default, regardless of whether collateral or
absolute in form. The differences between the two types, however, are of
considerable consequence to the ability of a mortgagee to take collection
remedies.
At present, Texas mortgage law adopts the legal fiction that the form of
the assignment of rents clause determines whether the mortgagee's right
to rents is immediately effective, regardless of the fact that, in substance,
every assignment of rents is merely a security device. 35 Despite the "in-
ordinately high premium [placed] upon the phraseology of the instru-
ment, ' 36 the "economic reality underlying" all assignments of rents is a
mortgagee's "desire to assure payment of the debt. ' 37
28. See Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981); Forrester, Rational Ap-
proach, supra note 8, at 363-64.
29. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Sterling Projects, Inc., 789 S.W.2d 358, 359-60 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
30. Forrester, Rational Approach, supra note 8, at 364 (explaining that collateral as-
signments of rents create an inchoate security interest "until the lender has activated the
assignment of rents making the security interest 'choate"').
31. Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 594. See FDIC v. Int'l Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1035
(5th Cir. 1991). See generally Forrester, Still Crazy, supra note 14, at 114-120 (chronicling
the historical development of the absolute assignment of rents).
32. Memorandum from Edward F. Lowry, Jr., supra note 13, at pt. II.B. In Texas, "[a]
conveyance of an interest in real property must be in writing, signed by the grantor, and
delivered to the grantee." Adams v. First Nat'l Bank of Bells/Savoy, 154 S.W.3d 859, 869
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.) (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.021 (Vernon
2003)).
33. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 789 S.W.2d at 360 (relying on Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 594).
34. See NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, supra note 2, § 4.35 at
245.
35. Memorandum from Edward F. Lowry, Jr., supra note 13, at pt. II.B. One might
struggle with distinctions drawn in Texas courts because, should Article 9 of the UCC gov-
ern assignments of rents, they would be considered "transfers intended to secure a debt"
regardless of form. See Int'l Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 929 F.2d at 1035.
36. Comment, Mortgagee's Right to Rents after Default, supra note 10, at 1428.
37. In re Allen, 357 B.R. 103, 115 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (explaining that an absolute
assignment-is "based on the trust concept[ ]"-and "merely enforces the mortgagee's
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1. Intent of the Parties
To determine whether an assignment of rents is collateral or absolute in
form, Texas courts consider the intent of the parties rather than isolated
words or phrases in the loan documents. 38 Both the assignment of rents
clause and the security agreements contemporaneously executed are con-
sidered. 39 When the granting clause of an assignment of rents includes
language that the instrument is given as "additional" or "further" secur-
ity, Texas courts favor the interpretation that the parties intended a col-
lateral assignment. 40 In fact, even if the loan document characterizes the
assignment as "absolute," Texas courts have still found the assignment to
be "collateral," holding that the mere usage of the word "absolute" is not
outcome determinative. 41 For instance, the Texarkana Court of Appeals
interpreted an assignment as a security (or a collateral assignment) where
the agreement "absolutely and unconditionally" conveyed the rents to
the mortgagee on the condition that the mortgagee enter, take posses-
sion, and collect accruing rents after the mortgagor's default.42 Even
though the clause purported to be a transfer of legal title, the agreement
was not immediately operative because it required further action by the
mortgagee, which could not be taken unless and until the loan was in
default.4 3
Likewise, bankruptcy courts may refuse to give effect to "boilerplate
'absolute assignment' language" such as: "This assignment of rents consti-
tutes an absolute assignment and not an assignment for additional secur-
ity only."'44 Despite this rather clear expression, a court will look beyond
such "boilerplate" to determine the actual nature of the transfer. For ex-
ample, a bankruptcy court found an assignment of rents which included
the above disclaimer to be "ambiguous" because an immediate transfer
of rights to rentswas not affected by operation of the provision.4 5 In that
case, the parties instead created the much-favored collateral assignment
of rents. 46 The borrower and lender were co-equal beneficiaries of the
rents held in trust unless and until the borrower defaults. Thus, upon
default the lender "bec[ame] sole beneficiary of the rents" which oc-
rights as a secured creditor... [without separating] ownership of rents from ownership of
the collateral"). FDIC v. Int'l Prop. Mgmt. Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1036 n.3 (5th Cir. 1991).
38. Cadle Co. v. Collin Creek Phase II Assocs., 998 S.W.2d 718, 723 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1999, no pet.) ("All of the provisions must be considered with reference to the
whole instrument, and no single provision taken alone will be given controlling effect.").
See also 801 Nolana, Inc. v. RTC Mortgage Trust 1994-S6, 944 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied); Oryx Energy Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank of Tex.,
895 S.W.2d 409, 415 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied).
39. Cadle Co., 998 S.W.2d at 723.
40. Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981).
41. Cadle Co., 998 S.W.2d at 720, 723-24.
42. Id. See also Oryx Energy Co., 895 S.W.2d at 415.
43. Oryx Energy Co., 895 S.W.2d at 415.
44. In re Allen, 357 B.R. 103, 112-13 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006)
45. Id. at 112.
46. Id. at 113.
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curred "only if [the lender] g[ave] notice of default. ' 47 The bankruptcy
court explained that all Texas state court and Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals cases which have interpreted a rental assignment to be absolute
share two things in common: "the absolute assignment of rents [was]
presently effective and the assignee [was] explicitly relieved of taking any
action to perfect the assignment of rents."' 48 In this case, however, the
borrower would lose his right to rents only if the lender provided it notice
of default, notwithstanding the absolute assignment language.49
Clear evidence, therefore, is generally required before a court will find
that the parties intended an immediate conveyance of legal title to
rents.50 This approach is the same as that taken by courts implying an
equitable mortgage: When a transfer of absolute title to real property is,
in effect, a security agreement for an existing debt, courts construe such
conveyances as a mortgage. 51 Indeed, is it permissible to evaluate the
nature of the assignment as further security for the mortgage, notwith-
standing that the borrower purportedly transferred legal title to the rental
stream? Of course, this approach of assessing the intentions of the par-
ties is at odds with the general expectations of lenders to have access to
rents upon borrowers' default, a right lenders believe the assignment
guarantees.
Despite Texas courts' aversion to absolute assignments of rents, if an
absolute assignment is drafted carefully, the courts will give effect to the
parties' intentions. Under Texas law, an absolute assignment of rents is
valid and given effect even when the assignment is "part of [a] larger
secured debt agreement.152 Take, for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals' opinion in FDIC v. International Property Management, holding
that-despite Texas courts' reluctance to interpret an assignment of rents
as absolute-the parties in the suit clearly executed a presently effective
conveyance of legal title to rents, which required no affirmative action,
legal proceeding, or notice to the lessees. 53
47. Id.
48. Id. at 112.
49. Id. at 112-13. More specifically, the borrower in this case agreed to use the mort-
gaged property as his homestead for the first year of the loan term; there would be no rents
accruing, then, for at least the first year after the execution of the deed of trust containing
the disputed assignment of rents clause. Id. at 111.
50. FDIC v. Int'l Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1036 (5th Cir. 1991).
51. Johnson v. Cherry, 726 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Tex. 1987).
52. 801 Nolana, Inc. v. RTC Mortgage Trust 1994-56, 944 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied). See also Int'l Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 929 F.2d at 1038
("Public policy does not require us to ignore clear and unambiguous intent of the parties as
expressed in their agreement.").
53. Int'l Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 929 S.W.2d at 1037-38. The court in In re Allen, see notes
44-49 above, cites the International Property Management opinion as an instance where an
assignment of rents clause clearly expressed the parties' intent to immediately transfer the
right to rents. See also Lawrence J. Fossi et al., Real Property, Part I, 45 Sw. L. J. 2055,
2062 (1992).
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2. Issues of Public Policy
While Texas courts recognize, in theory, two types of assignments of
rents, they favor construing assignments as additional security for the
debt and require action by the lender for activation.54 The Texas Su-
preme Court cited with approval the following public policy argument
crafted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:
It seems unlikely that mere words of assignment of future rents can
entitle a mortgagee to claim rentals which have been collected by a
mortgagor and mingled with its other property. Sound policy as well
as every probable intention should prevent a mortgagee from inter-
fering with the mortgagor's possession until the mortgagee takes
steps to get the rentals within his control. To hold otherwise would
be to impose unworkable restrictions upon industry in cases where
mortgagors have been led to suppose that they might rightfully apply
the rentals to their own business. 55
The Second Circuit emphasized that an owner-mortgagor in a commercial
real estate deal, from an "industry" perspective, expects to retain control
of rents without an affirmative obligation to apply his rents only to the
loan debt.56 Indeed, should a lender levy immediately upon the rents, the
lender might not apply the rents to the underlying mortgage debt because
loan agreements generally fail to provide an affirmative obligation to do
so.57 By embracing the Second Circuit's Liberdar Holding opinion, the
Texas Supreme Court sent the message that, despite an assignment of
rents clause, a commercial borrower expects the lender to "negotiate" a
solution "informally," and to the satisfaction of both parties, should a
mortgage payment become overdue. 58 If the lien on the rents is immedi-
ately effective upon default, as it would be under an absolute assignments
clause, mortgagors would not be given an opportunity to retain control of
rents while catching up on mortgage payments through informal negotia-
tion. In commercial deals, business acumen likely favors a lender being
slow to take control of rents the moment a borrower defaults; instead,
lenders are likely to negotiate "until [they] conclude that the situation is
hopeless or that continued delay may harm [them]." '59
In contrast to Taylor, the better view on the basis of policy and practice
is that a mortgagor in default has less of an incentive to apply rents to the
outstanding debt, especially in Texas where foreclosure is a quick and
54. Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981) (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Liberdar Holding Corp., 74 F.2d 50, 51 (2d Cir. 1934)).
55. Id.
56. See Liberdar Holding Corp., 74 F.2d at 51.
57. See Int'l Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 929 S.W.2d at 1036; NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL Es-
TATE FINANCE LAW, supra note 2, § 4.35, at 247 (citing In re Kidd's Estate, 292 N.Y.S. 888
(1936)).
58. See Int'l Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 929 S.W.2d at 1036.
59. Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Recognizing Lenders' Rents Interests in Bankruptcy, 27
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 281, 290 (1992). This 1992 Randolph article is a revised and
updated version of an earlier work that originally appeared at 23 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 833
(1990) entitled When Should Bankruptcy Courts Recognize Lenders' Rents Interests?.
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non-judicial process. 6° Moreover, in the context of a non-recourse loan, a
borrower recognizes that its mortgagee may only reach the value the
property itself retains, as its mortgagee cannot bring a deficiency judg-
ment against the borrower should the foreclosure sale proceeds fail to
discharge the full value of the loan. If a lender, therefore, includes an
assignment of rents in a non-recourse loan agreement, it has contem-
plated a future ability to collect rents prior to foreclosure in order to real-
ize upon the pledged asset. The lender takes a consensual lien on rents as
a basis of the loan agreement. Such clauses do not, therefore, seem
unreasonable.
II. ENFORCEMENT OF A SECURITY INTEREST IN RENTS
A. ENFORCING AN ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS IN TEXAS
1. Taylor v. Brennan Requirements
The most important Texas Supreme Court case concerning the inter-
pretation and consequent enforcement of assignment of rents clauses is
Taylor v. Brennan.61 To date, the Taylor opinion resolves the enforce-
ment of security interests in rents as it established that Texas would fol-
low "the common law rule that [a collateral assignment of rents clause]
does not become operative until the mortgagee obtains possession of the
property, or impounds the rents, or secures the appointment of a re-
ceiver, or takes some other similar action. ''62 Rents that accrue prior to
the taking of such affirmative action will remain with the mortgagor. 63
Consider, for example, a case in which a lender only records its collateral
assignment of rents and fails to take affirmative steps to enforce it.
Under Texas law, when a third party creditor later gets a judgment
against the borrower, the judgment creditor may file an ancillary lawsuit
to garnish those rents. Because the mortgagee did not activate its incho-
ate lien (collateral assignment of rents), the judgment creditor will take
the rents to the exclusion of the mortgagee. 64
The Taylor court was silent as to the scope of its critical phrase: "other
similar action." Subsequently, courts have determined what action is in
the spirit of the common law rule. In cases after Taylor, Texas appellate
courts have held that "other similar action" includes both statutory gar-
nishment by the mortgagee and injunctions that limit or bar the mortga-
gor's use of its rents.65
60. See Forrester, Rational Approach, supra note 8, at 352; Comment, Mortgagee's
Right to Rents after Default, supra note 10, at 1426-27.
61. See Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1981).
62. Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 594.
63. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Sterling Projects, Inc., 789 S.W.2d 358, 360 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
64. Forrester, Still Crazy, supra note 14, at 109 (relying on In re Millette, 186 F.3d 638,
642 (5th Cir. 1999)).
65. See Jefferson Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Adams, 802 S.W.2d 811, 813-14 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1990, writ denied); Betzen v. Exxon Corp., 699 S.W.2d 352, 354-55 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
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Properly applied, enforcement of collateral assignments of rents under
Taylor is burdensome because either judicial action or the mortgagee tak-
ing possession of the property is required. The court's invigoration of the
policy arguments above, added to the steps required to effectively en-
force a collateral assignment, protect the financial interests of the mortga-
gor and his traditional right to possession of the mortgaged property and
control of rents.
2. What Constitutes "Rent" in Texas?
A discussion of commercial lenders' interests in rents raises the ques-
tion: what constitutes "rents" under Texas law? While gross rent profits
are a type of income one usually associates with a commercial real estate
project, other sources of income related to the operation and manage-
ment of the property may or may not be rents as contemplated by Texas
law. For example, Texas law defines rents in the context of the "landlord/
tenant relationship and not ... the innkeeper/lodger relationship. '6 6 In
the ordinary landlord-tenant relationship, monies paid by an occupier
under a lease to the owner-mortgagor are rents; and a lease is a posses-
sory interest in land. 67 A license agreement, however, might produce in-
come that is not part of the rental stream. For example, a hotel guest is a
licensee under Texas law.68 Under a license agreement, a licensee is al-
lowed "to use land in the possession of another. '69
Perfection of security interests in rents paid by licensees is problematic
for lenders. Unlike the enforcement and perfection of assignments in
rents, which are governed by Texas property law, an assignment of reve-
nues from a parking garage would be governed by Article 9 of the U.C.C.
Therefore, a lender must file a financing statement with the Texas Secre-
tary of State to perfect a security interest in parking fees paid by licen-
sees.70 In a commercial real estate transaction for a building with tenants
leasing space as well as renting parking, a prudent lender must both file
an Article 9 financing statement as well as record an assignment of rents
with the county clerk in the county in which the real property is located in
order to ensure its rights to both types of revenues. 71 This process is gen-
erally a hassle because it requires more paperwork and filing fees for the
lender. As will be discussed in Part III, however, if the borrower files for
bankruptcy, the lender will lose its ability to collect post-petition parking
fees that accrue, notwithstanding the fact that it perfected a security inter-
est by filing a financing statement. Therefore, it would be in commercial
66. In re Corpus Christi Hotel Partners, Ltd., 133 B.R. 850, 854 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1991).
67. See id.
68. Id.; Patel v. Northfield Ins. Co., 940 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
69. Freyermuth, Hotel Revenues, Rents, and Formalism, supra note 7, at 1467-68. See
also In re Corpus Christi, 133 B.R. at 854.
70. See In re Corpus Christi, 133 B.R. at 852.
71. Filing a financing statement with the Secretary of State and recording an assign-
ment of rents in the county land records is the "belt and suspenders" approach. Id.; Uni-
form Assignment of Rents Act (UARA) § 2 cmt. 12 (2005).
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lenders' interest to have the Texas legislature broaden the definition of
rents, by adopting the UARA, to include both rents paid by tenants as
well as fees paid by licensees-at least in the context of revenues attacha-
ble under an assignment of rents clause.
3. Avoidance of Mortgagee-in-Possession Liability
In Taylor, the Texas Supreme Court held that a mortgagee may enforce
a collateral assignment of rents by obtaining possession of the mortgaged
property in order to collect rents.72 In a lien theory state, however, a
mortgagor has the right to possession of the mortgaged property, despite
default, until foreclosure. A mortgagor in Texas must, therefore, consent
before a mortgagee may take possession of the property. For this reason,
loan agreements usually provide express provisions granting the lender
the right to possession upon the mortgagor's default. A mortgagee-in-
possession, however, is under a duty to manage the mortgaged property
in a reasonably prudent and careful manner in order to keep it in a good
state of repair.73 Connected to the mortgagee's responsibility to maintain
the premises is a mortgagee-in-possession's assumption of liability to
third parties "for injuries resulting either through its actionable fault in
utilizing the property or by reason of its failure to perform duties im-
posed by law upon the owner of the land."'74 Overall, the rules governing
the conduct of a mortgagee-in-possession make enforcement by posses-
sion an unfavorable method.
To be sure, a good drafter will include a provision in the assignment of
rents clause that expressly provides that enforcement cannot be con-
strued as the lender becoming a mortgagee-in-possession of the property.
Such a provision should discharge the lender from any obligation to col-
lect rents, to exercise diligence in collecting rents, or to incur expenses
with respect to the leases and rents. The lender, in execution and en-
forcement of the assignment, would accept no responsibility for the care
and management of the premises. Moreover, the lender would require
language discharging it from being held liable in any way for any injury or
damage to person or property sustained by any person in or about the
property.
4. Appointment of Receiver
Given the rigors associated with enforcement by possession, it is under-
standable why a lender might prefer to enforce a security interest in rents
72. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Whether the mortgagee is in possession
is a question of fact that is dependent upon the "nature and condition of the property."
NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, supra note 2, § 4.25, at 218. Courts
look for evidence that "the mortgagee exercise[s] 'dominion and control' over the mort-
gaged real estate" in a similar manner as the mortgagor. Id.
73. Travis v. Schonwald, 131 S.W.2d 827, 829-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1939,
writ ref'd); Bomar v. Smith, 195 S.W. 964, 980 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1917, no writ).
74. NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, supra note 2, § 4.26, at 219.
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by judicial appointment of a receiver.75 For example, collection of rents
under a receivership will not subject a mortgagee to tort liability for inju-
ries to third parties.76 In addition, the lender avoids becoming a mortga-
gee-in-possession, as "the mere fact that the mortgagee receives the rents
and profits does not constitute him a mortgagee in possession, unless he
takes the rent in such a way as to take out of the hands of the mortgagor
the management and control of the estate." 77 To properly meet filing
requirements, the mortgagee in Texas would need to follow Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure as well as any applicable local rules. 78 For example, a
receiver's bond is required. 79
In Texas, a lien theory state, a mortgagee's equitable right to a receiver
for control of the property itself is not triggered by default, as a mortga-
gor retains rights to possession, use, and profits until foreclosure.80
Under existing Texas statutory law, a mortgagee may not obtain appoint-
ment of a receiver unless there is a significant and material threat to the
land and improvements, or the mortgagor is in default and the real prop-
erty is inadequate security.81
Fortunately for lenders seeking a receiver for control and use of rents,
they need not allege that the real property is in danger of being lost or
injured. 82 The Texas Supreme Court's language in Taylor does not re-
quire that lenders allege the real property is insufficient to discharge the
debt, as the property and rents are separate securities. 83
It is common to see a loan agreement provision that expressly autho-
rizes "the appointment of a receiver on default to collect rents and profits
and apply them to the secured debt." 84 This receivership clause is de-
signed to work in tandem with the assignment of rents to fully protect the
mortgagees' interest in rents. Nevertheless, the recital in a deed of trust
that the parties agree to the appointment of a receiver in the event of
default is merely "one of the equities to be considered" and thus, is not
75. A receiver can only be appointed by a court. And, "[a]lthough a receiver repre-
sents all parties [sic] interests in the litigation wherein he is appointed,... generally he is
the agent of the appointing court." Payne v. Snyder, 661 S.W.2d 134, 143 (Tex. Ct. App.-
Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Dillingham v. Putnam, 14 S.W. 303, 305 (Tex.
1980) ("Property in the hands of a receiver is theoretically in the hands of the court that
appointed him ... ").
76. NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, supra note 2, § 4.32, at 236.
77. First Nat'l Bank in Graham v. Corbin, 153 S.W.2d 979, 982 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1941, writ denied).
78. See generally TEX. R. Civ. PROC. §§ 695, 695a. See infra note 179 and accompany-
ing text.
79. TEX. R. Civ. PRoc. § 695a.
80. See King Land & Cattle Corp. v. Fikes, 414 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
81. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 64.001(c) (Vernon 1997).
82. Riverside Props. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am., 590 S.W.2d 736, 737-38
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th] 1979, no writ).
83. Jesse B. Heath, Jr., New Developments in Real Estate Financing, 12 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 811, 826-27 (1981).
84. NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, supra note 2, § 4.35, at 242.
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determinative in a Texas court's decision. 85 The reason for this is that
courts have discretion to appoint a receiver in equity.86
Overall, judicial enforcement of an assignment of rents clause is gener-
ally burdensome, especially since foreclosures in Texas are usually non-
judicial, because lenders typically use deeds of trust.87 A Texas foreclo-
sure is a relatively fast process, as the mortgagee must mail a written no-
tice a minimum of twenty-one days before the date of sale-which is the
first Tuesday of each calendar month-to only the owner-mortgagor, in
addition to the formalities of posting a public notice at the courthouse
door and filing a notice in the office of the county clerk located in the
same county as the property at issue.88 Because deeds of trust require no
judicial action, it is "rare" that lenders would enforce collateral assign-
ments of rents by judicial action. 89
5. Waste of Rents
Under Texas law, when a mortgagee takes affirmative steps to ade-
quately enforce its collateral assignment of rents, a mortgagor's subse-
quent failure to turn over the rents or apply rents to the mortgage debt
"constitutes legal waste." 90 Taylor v. Brennan, the seminal Texas Su-
preme Court case on rents assigned as security, was a suit for damages for
waste of security. 91 The court recognized that a mortgagor's milking of
rents may give rise to a cause of action in waste, so long as the mortgagee
has taken the requisite affirmative steps to enforce its security interest in
the rentals.92 Because rents are a separate security from the underlying
real property, the measure of damages is the amount of rents collected
after default but not applied to the mortgage debt.93 In a general suit for
waste on the real property itself, such as when the owner-mortgagor
removes improvements, a mortgagee has a colorable claim only if the
value of the property, notwithstanding the damages, is insufficient secur-
ity for the mortgage debt.94 In Taylor, the Texas Supreme Court estab-
85. Riverside Props., 590 S.W.2d at 738 (holding, nonetheless, that a reciever was ap-
propriate). Under the Restatement, a mortgagee is entitled to a receivership "if the mort-
gagor is in default... and the mortgage or other agreement contains either [an assignment
of rents clause] or a provision authorizing appointment of a receiver to take possession and
collect rents upon mortgagor default." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES
§ 4.3(b) (1997).
86. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 64.004 (Vernon 2007).
87. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon 2003). Lenders foreclose under the
power of sale provision in a deed of trust which, under Texas statute, occurs at a publicly
held auction. Id.
88. See id. § 51.002(b)(1)-(3)
89. In re Vill. Props., Ltd., 723 F.2d 441, 446 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984).
90. Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex. 1981). See also Uniform Assignment
of Rents Act ("UARA") § 14 cmt. 1 (2005).
91. Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 593.
92. Id. at 593-95.
93. Heath, supra note 83, at 826.
94. Frio Inv., Inc. v. 4m-IRC/Rohde, 705 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Texas courts have pronounced that "a mortgagee is entitled to the
amount of the diminution of his security, and not necessarily the amount of damage done
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lished that an assignment of rents is a separate security, meaning that the
lender is only required to have taken affirmative steps to collect rents,
and there is no issue as to whether the property itself is adequate
security. 95
6. Conclusion
A sophisticated commercial lender in Texas should carefully draft abso-
lute assignments of rents into its mortgage documents. In order to create
an absolute assignment of rents, the lender must pretend to take title to
rents; thus, the assignment of rents clause in the loan documents, albeit
given as additional security for the debt, stands as an immediate transfer
of legal title. Once the lender has an absolute assignment of rents, it is
perfected when it is recorded. Furthermore, its absolute assignment of
rents may be enforced by sending notices or as otherwise described in the
agreement. A mortgagee holding an absolute assignment of rents may
seek injunctive relief and receivership to prevent the mortgagor from col-
lecting rents.96 In truth, a mortgagee may use any remedy available to
enforce a collateral assignment of rents for the enforcement of an abso-
lute assignment of rents. 97 Within a carefully drafted absolute assignment
of rents, a sophisticated lender should include language expressly dis-
charging it from any liability to third parties, denying responsibilities as a
mortgagee-in-possession, and refuting any obligation to maintain the
premises.
III. "THE KNOTFIY ISSUES SURROUNDING RENT
ASSIGNMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY '98
A. TUG OF WAR
Federal bankruptcy courts frequently handle disagreements between
mortgagors and mortgagees related to the enforcement of assignments of
rents, since a commercial mortgagor in default is likely to be so finan-
cially troubled that bankruptcy results.99 As soon as the bankruptcy peti-
tion is filed, a tug of war begins between the debtor (or bankruptcy
trustee) and his common creditors. While there are five kinds of bank-
ruptcy cases, the debtor seeks relief through either liquidation or reor-
ganization of his finances. In the context of commercial real estate-this
Article's primary focus-a debtor who owns an income producing prop-
to the property; because, where his security is still sufficient or his debt finally paid, he is
not damaged." Wheeler v. Peterson, 331 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1960,
writ dism'd).
95. Heath, supra note 83, at 827.
96. See 801 Nolana, Inc. v. RTC Trust, 944 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1997, writ denied); NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. Sterling Projects, Inc., 789 S.W.2d
358, 360 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
97. In re Viii. Props. Ltd., 723 F.2d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1984).
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.2, Reporter's Note,
Introductory note, cmt. a.
99. See id.
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erty is "typically a partnership or corporate entity that has no assets other
than the development" and will likely want to restructure and discharge
its debts with a reorganization plan rather than a bankruptcy that liqui-
dates all of its non-exempt assets. 1° ° Therefore, the profits from the
property, such as rents, will be useful, if not essential, to the debtor's
rehabilitation. 10 1 The debtor seeks to block the mortgagee from collect-
ing rents post-petition.10 2 Should the debtor succeed, the lenders' ability
to enforce a lien on rents is frustrated when the bankruptcy proceeding
suspends their ability to not only foreclose on the property, but also pro-
tect the value of their security at the very moment when they need the
rents most: when the debtor-mortgagor is no longer making the loan
payments. 10 3
B. THE PERFECTION HEADACHE
State property law governs the enforcement and perfection of assign-
ments of rents in the bankruptcy context. 10 4 As discussed above, Texas
case law has established that a mortgagee's collateral assignment of rents
is not operative unless and until it has taken affirmative steps to enforce
its security interests.10 5 The Bankruptcy Code may prevent a Texas mort-
gagee from enforcing its security interest in rents once the mortgagor is in
bankruptcy. The debtor-mortgagor's filing a bankruptcy petition gives
rise to an automatic stay of pending proceedings by creditors against the
debtor's estate or enforcement of liens on the debtor's assets.10 6 Of
course, if the mortgagee and mortgagor executed an absolute assignment
of rents, the issue of post-petition perfection is irrelevant, because the
mortgagee perfected its security interest upon recordation and thus, the
automatic stay would have no effect on the mortgagee's lien attaching to
post-petition rents.
Until 1994, debate over the perfection of assignments of rents had been
mired in varying and technical constructions of states' property law. Fi-
nally, the United States Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in an
attempt to create uniform rules for the post-petition perfection and en-
forcement of assignments of rents in bankruptcy proceedings. However,
as the following sections explain, the Code's new language fails to fully
protect lenders' access to rents.
100. See Freyermuth, Hotel Revenues, Rents and Formalism, supra note 7, at 1463.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Randolph, supra note 54, at 289.
104. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 48-49 (1979).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
106. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4)-(5) (2005). Section 362(a), in general, lists acts and actions
that are stayed by the bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C.§ 362(b)-(d) for specific exceptions
to the automatic stay and circumstances under which a bankruptcy court may grant a credi-
tor relief from the stay.
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1. Perfection of a Security Interest in Rents Before 1994
Lenders in commercial projects and transactions include an after-ac-
quired property clause in the loan agreement to take a consensual lien on
property the borrower acquires in the future. Section 552(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code cuts off lenders' claims to property acquired after the bank-
ruptcy petition is filed. 10 7 For corporate entities filing a bankruptcy
petition, section 552(a) therefore, "serves an important economic func-
tion, as an after-acquired property clause" and, if allowed to remain le-
gally effective, "would prevent the debtor from using assets acquired
post-petition as collateral to obtain the credit necessary to fund its reor-
ganization. 10 8 Congress, however, created an exception in section
552(b):
[I]f the debtor and [a secured.party] entered into a security agree-
ment before the commencement of the case and if the security inter-
est created by such security agreement extends to property of the
debtor acquired before the commencement of the case and to pro-
ceeds, product, offspring, or profits of such property, then such se-
curity interest extends to such proceeds, products, offspring, or
profits acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to
the extent provided by such security agreement and by applicable
nonbankruptcy law, except to any extent that the court, after notice
and a hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders
otherwise. 109
Before Congress amended section 552(b) as part of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1994, federal bankruptcy courts in Texas-and across the
country-construed a mortgagee's assignment of rents to continue on
post-petition rents only when the security interest was enforceable under
state law-applicable nonbankruptcy law.110 In fact, section 552(b) "re-
flects Congress' historical concern that property rights usually should be
controlled by state law instead of the 'mere happenstance' of bank-
ruptcy." '1 11 This meant that the mortgagee's interest deserved the same
protection regardless of whether the mortgagor filed for bankruptcy. l1 2
The applicable nonbankruptcy law in Texas establishes that a collateral
assignment of rents is not effective "until the mortgagee obtains posses-
sion of the property, or impounds the rents, or secures the appointment
107. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988) ("Except as provided in [section 552(b)], property ac-
quired by the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to
any lien resulting from any security agreement entered into by the debtor before the com-
mencement of the case."); see, e.g., In re T-H New Orleans Ltd., 10 F.3d 1099, 1104 (5th
Cir. 1993); In re Landing Assocs., Ltd., 122 B.R. 288, 294 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
108. Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents, supra note 8, at 8.
109. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2004 & Supp. 2006) (emphasis added).
110. See In re Casbeer, 793 F.2d 1436, 1442 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Butner v. United
States, 440 U.S. 48, 55-57 (1979); In re Viii. Props. Ltd., 723 F.2d 441, 443 (5th Cir. 1984)).
111. In re Vill. Props., Ltd., 723 F.2d at 444.
112. Randolph, supra note 59, at 304 (discussing the holding in Butner v. United States,
440 U.S. 48 (1979)).
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of a receiver, or takes some other similar action. 11 3 The list of affirma-
tive steps for proper enforcement under Taylor v. Brennan is not exclu-
sive, as suggested by the final phrase: "or takes similar action. '114 Under
section 552(b), therefore, if the mortgagee has properly enforced its se-
curity interest under the Taylor doctrine, as well as the specific loan
agreement, the mortgagee retains its lien against post-petition rents.11 5
In In re Village Properties, Ltd., for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, considered whether a mortgagee
holding a collateral assignment of rents was entitled to rents that had
accrued after the bankruptcy petition was filed, given that the mortgagee
had yet to take affirmative steps to enforce the assignment.11 6 The Fifth
Circuit held that the mortgagee was not entitled to post-petition rents
because the assignment was "impotent" for the mortgagee's failure to ob-
tain sequestration or take other affirmative action.117 In dicta, however,
the court contemplated that "[i]n future cases ... federal courts may be
faced with situations where a Texas mortgagee petitions for sequestra-
tion, a receiver or adequate protection but the granting of the petition is
delayed or denied, 11 8 and that, "[u]nder the Bankruptcy Code, however,
such petitions need not be granted by a federal court for the Texas mort-
gagee to perfect his interest in rentals."" 9 The court cited that critical
language-other similar action-to find that merely filing a petition for
receiver, regardless of outcome, is "affirmative action" of the type con-
templated in the Taylor opinion. 20 Ironically, the Fifth Circuit eschews
formalism-favored by Texas jurisprudence on assignments of rents-to
posit that "[t]he form of the action required to perfect the mortgagee's
interest is not as important as its substantive thrust-diligent action by
the mortgagee which demonstrates that he would probably have obtained
the rents had bankruptcy not intervened.' 12'
Despite the above-mentioned difficulty of squaring the Taylor doctrine
with the Bankruptcy Code, federal bankruptcy courts have allowed mort-
gagees to perfect a security interest in rents after the bankruptcy petition
date. Even when a Texas mortgagee failed to take affirmative action
before the filing of the mortgagor-debtor's bankruptcy petition, it per-
fected its collateral assignment of rents post-petition by filing a motion
for relief from the stay and a motion for preliminary injunction to pro-
hibit the debtor from using the rents (or "cash collateral"). 122 Perfection
113. Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981).
114. See supra text accompanying note 65.
115. Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents, supra note 8, at 8.
116. In re ViL. Props., Ltd, 723 F.2d at 443.





122. In re Casbeer, 793 F.2d 1436, 1436 (5th Cir. 1986). This opinion has been cited
with approval by the United States Supreme Court. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers
of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 367, 374 (1988).
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by filing a notice with the bankruptcy court, under section 546(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code, is considered by some courts to be an exception to the
automatic stay and the bankruptcy trustee's avoidance powers. 123
Rather, section 546(b) of the Bankruptcy Code allows mortgagees to per-
fect after the filing of the bankruptcy petition by giving the debtor notice
of intent to enforce the collateral assignment of rents.124 Allowance of
post-petition perfection, nevertheless, does not "relate back" to before
the bankruptcy petition was filed. 125 This emphasizes the inconsistent de-
terminations of bankruptcy courts as to the ability of lenders to reach
post-petition rents.
A third and final wrinkle to the post-petition enforcement problem
arises when the commercial property is occupied by a licensee rather than
a tenant. A security interest in rents is governed by Texas state law re-
quirements for the recordation of the writing in the public land records in
the county where the land is located, and the enforcement and perfection
of the security interest requires that the affirmative steps established in
Taylor v. Brennan be taken. As previously mentioned, "rents" under
Texas law refers to the landlord-tenant relationship, not the hotel-guest
relationship. 126 R. Wilson Freyermuth, the UARA reporter, has criti-
cized the notion that hotel room rentals are not included in the rents
pledged under an assignment of rents clause. 127 Before 1994, section
552(a) operated to cut-off a lender's ability to collect "funds generated by
post-petition operation of [a] hotel" as the room revenues did not consti-
tute rents or proceeds under Texas law.128 Nevertheless, logic strongly
suggests that this construction misreads the actual intent of lenders and
borrowers in commercial real estate transactions who have contracted a
pledge of the project's income from which the lender expects to realize
the pledged income, regardless of state law's semantic distinction be-
tween tenants and licensees.
2. The Effect of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994
Section 214 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act amended section 552(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code. The new subsection, 552(b), deals only with rents:
123. In re Lake Austin Centre Joint Venture, 106 B.R. 106, 108 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989)
(citing In re Casbeer, 793 F.2d at 1443-44).
124. In re Casbeer, 793 F.2d at 1443; Wolters Viii., Ltd. v. Viii. Props., Ltd., 723 F.2d
441, 444 (5th Cir. 1986). See also In re Corpus Christi Hotel Partners, Ltd., 133 B.R. 850,
851-52 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991) (in which a secured party filed a Notice of Perfection of
Interest in Rents under 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)); Nat'l Real Estate Ltd. v. Consolidated Capital
Prop., 104 B.R. 968, 971 (Bankr. E.D. Wisc. 1989) (same). In addition, a mortgagee's "fil-
ing a motion under 11 U.S.C. § 363 operate[s] as a Bankruptcy Code-created remedy to
perfect its interests in the rents from the Property as would a notice given under 11 U.S.C.
§ 546(b)." In re Salmanson, 132 B.R. 547, 551 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
125. In re Casbeer, 793 F.2d at 1443. The mortgagee would receive a "windfall" should
the post-petition perfection allow collection of pre-petition rents. Id. (quoting Butner, 440
U.S. at 55). See also In re Salmanson, 132 B.R. at 552.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
127. See generally Freyermuth, Hotel Revenues, Rents, and Formalism, supra note 7.
128. In re Corpus Christi Hotel Partners, Ltd., 133 B.R. at 854-57.
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[I]f the debtor and [a secured party] entered into a security agree-
ment before the commencement of the case and if the security inter-
est created by such security agreement extends to property of the
debtor acquired before commencement of the case and to amounts
paid as rents of such property or the fees, charges, accounts, or other
payments for the use or occupancy of rooms and other public facili-
ties in hotels, motels, or other lodging properties, then such security
interest extends to such rents and such fees, charges, accounts, or
other payments acquired by the estate after the commencement of
the case to the extent provided in such security agreement, except to
any extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the
equities of the case, orders otherwise. 129
Unlike the pre-1994 section, as well as subsection 552(b)(1), subsection
552(b)(2) does not include the problematic phrase "applicable nonban-
kruptcy law." 130 Mortgagees who take a lien on rents before the bank-
ruptcy proceeding with an assignment of rents will have a valid lien on
post-petition rents, despite the mortgagees' failure to perfect the security
interest under applicable state mortgage law.' 31
Confusion and thus inconsistent treatment of assignment of rents in
bankruptcy is a product of the courts' failure to distinguish between what
the Taylor court described as activation of an inchoate lien (a collateral
assignment of rents) and perfection of a security interest. In contrast to
the notion of activation, perfection describes the method by which a
lienholder puts third parties and future creditors on notice that it has a
superior security interest. Section 214 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
should allow mortgagees in Texas to continue to have a valid lien on
rents, pursuant to a recorded collateral assignment of rents, even when
the mortgagee had failed to take affirmative steps required under Texas
state law to enforce and perfect the security interest in rents.
After the 1994 amendment, legal scholars were hopeful that the new
subsection 552(b)(2) created uniformity in the treatment of collateral as-
signments with a new "federal standard" for enforcement. 132 It seemed
that Congress recognized that states' real property laws governing secur-
ity interests in rents were created "without regard to the problem of
postpetition perfection in bankruptcy" and thus the Code no longer man-
dated that "bankruptcy courts . . . shoehorn rents clauses into specific
categories with state court doctrine that has not been designed for the
purpose. ' 133 It still remains to be seen whether the 1994 changes have
remedied the confusion surrounding postpetition perfection in Texas
129. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1994).
130. See id.
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES, § 4.2, Reporter's Note, Introduc-
tory note, cmt. a (citing 140 Cong. Rec. H10752, at H10768 (1994) (statement of Rep.
Brooks)).
132. R. Wilson Freyermuth, The Circus Continues-Security Interests in Rents, Con-
gress, the Bankruptcy Courts, and the "Rents are Subsumed in the Land" Hypothesis, 6 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 115, 120-21 (1997).
133. Randolph, supra note 59, at 300-01.
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bankruptcy courts. For example, a bankruptcy court in the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas recently denied a lender's objection to a Chapter 13
debtor's plan where the lender argued that it owned the rental stream
and, thus, the debtor should not be allowed to use future rents for pur-
poses of its plan.13 4 The court determined that the assignment of rents
provided additional security for the loan (a collateral assignment), rather
than an absolute transfer of title to rents.135 The court, in confirming the
debtor's Chapter 13 plan, explained that "a creditor must 'perfect' a col-
lateral assignment of rents before its rights can take effect," citing to pre-
1994 case law.136 Its failure to discuss the 1994 changes to the Code as to
postpetition perfection of assignment of rents was an oversight-at
best-and raises the specter that Congress has not yet solved the perfec-
tion headache. After 1994, bankruptcy courts were not supposed look to
nonbankruptcy law, such as Texas mortgage law, to determine whether
the creditor has a valid lien on postpetition rents. Nevertheless, the ulti-
mate confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan would be unaffected by the
1994 changes. The court's opinion emphasized that lenders do not actu-
ally own the rental stream via an assignment of rents clause in a deed of
trust, due to the fact that the lender cannot "sell the future rents because
its right to them terminates when the deed of trust is canceled.' 37 Per-
haps more importantly, the plan provided payments to the mortgagor,
made via the trustee, in excess of the monthly rents.138 Overall, this re-
cent case merely emphasizes the continuing uncertainty as to perfection
of assignment of rents in bankruptcy.
The new subsection expressly includes hotel room revenues as rent,
which overrules federal bankruptcy courts' prior rulings that held other-
wise when applying Texas state property law.' 39 Even though subsection
552(b)(2) "effectively mooted the classification dilemma with respect to
hotels and other 'lodging properties... [it] did not address a wide variety
of other income-generating projects.' 140 Examples of income producing
commercial real estate projects where the owner-mortgagor stands in a
licensor-licensee relationship with the occupier include parking garages,
golf courses, landfills, marinas, stadiums, student dormitories, and ho-
tels.141 Therefore, despite the 1994 revision of section 552, assignments of
the above mentioned project revenues, as governed by Article 9, means
debtors can seek refuge in bankruptcy from creditors realizing upon
134. In re Allen, 357 B.R. 103, 107 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).
135. Id. at 118.
136. Id. at 109 (citing In re Viii. Prop., Ltd., 723 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1984)). Additionally,
the bankruptcy court cites In re Casbeer, 793 F.2d 1436 (5th Cir. 1986) for the proposition
that a lender may perfect its collateral assignment of rents during a bankruptcy by filing a
post-petition motion for preliminary injunction to prohibit the debtor from using the rents.
Id.
137. Id. at 115-16.
138. Id. at 115.
139. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1994).
140. Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents, supra note 8, at 14.
141. Id. at 9-10.
[Vol. 60
2007] Texas Should Adopt the Uniform Assignment of Rents Act 599
pledged income that does not fall under section 552(b)(2). 142
The reporter for the new UARA, Wilson Freyermuth, criticizes the
new section 552(b)(2) on the assessment that it failed to create a uniform
federal standard. Freyermuth argues that despite the legislative intent
behind subsection (b)(2), the statute is poorly drafted because it fails to
expressly state that the section will preempt state mortgage law. 143 He
emphasizes that Congress overlooked section 544 of the Bankruptcy
Code, known as the "strong-arm" statute, which allows either the bank-
ruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession to "avoid any security interest that
a judgment creditor of personalty or a bona fide purchaser of realty could
have avoided under state law as of the petition date.' 1 44 Freyermuth's
argument suggests that if a lender in Texas fails to take affirmative steps
to enforce its collateral assignment of rents prior to the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition, the debtor can avoid post-petition enforcement by opera-
tion of section 544. Because section 552(b)(2)'s protection for rents is
expressly subject to section 544's strong-arm provision, however,
Freyermuth questions whether the subsection will preempt state law re-
garding the enforcement of an assignment of rents as attaching to hotel
revenues.
14 5
The UARA, which Freyermuth drafted, would resolve questions re-
maining as to proper interpretation of state law on the enforcement of
assignments of rents in the context of bankruptcy. A statute for state and
federal courts in Texas to follow would "reduce uncertainty" and "pre-
vent a party from receiving a windfall merely by reason of the happen-
stance of bankruptcy." 14 6 The Texas legislature should adopt the UARA
to simplify the law governing rental assignments and to discard "the slip-
pery legal concepts and technical constructions of the mortgage lan-
guage" now preventing mortgagees in Texas from realizing upon the
pledged rentals. 147 Finally, the Act squares perfection of security inter-
ests in rents with the general procedure for perfection of security interests
in personal property: recordation.
IV. THE UARA-A BET-TrER APPROACH FOR TEXAS
A. CREATION OF A SECURITY INTEREST IN RENTS
1. Abolition of Absolute Assignment of Rents
Given the harsh consequences that result from the formalism of Texas
mortgage law, sophisticated commercial mortgagees execute "absolute"
assignments of rents to ensure their access to the pledged collateral. Un-
142. Id. at 15.
143. Id. at 28.
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES, § 4.2 Reporter's Note, Introduc-
tory note, cmt. a.
145. See Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents, supra note 8, at 28.
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.2 Reporter's Note, Introduc-
tory note, cmt. a (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)).
147. Comment, Mortgagee's Right to Rents after Default, supra note 10, at 1447.
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fortunately, the transfer of legal title to rents, to create a security interest,
creates needless litigation. This charade is inefficient because courts must
determine the actual intent of the parties. Because legalese and formal-
ism controls, actual intent from an industry perspective might not be re-
flected in the loan agreement, despite the parties' best efforts. For
example, if an unsophisticated entity financed a commercial real estate
project, albeit rare and ill-advised, the lender is unlikely to understand
the pitfalls and frustrations lurking behind a collateral assignment of
rents. And because courts favor collateral assignments as a matter of pol-
icy, even sophisticated lenders' "absolute" assignments of rents are scruti-
nized by courts looking for language that suggests the assignment
provides merely additional security for the mortgage.
The UARA, if adopted, would eliminate the distinction between a col-
lateral and absolute assignment of rents now present in Texas. The
UARA recognizes that all assignments of rents, regardless of form, are
generally executed to create additional security for the mortgage debt. 148
The Act's reporter, R. Wilson Freyermuth, says that the legislation would
"elevate substance over form. ' 149 The UARA emphasizes the reality
that it should make little difference whether the assignment of rents abso-
lutely conveys the rents or conditionally assigns the rents as additional
security for the underlying mortgage debt. Fundamentally then, Texas
mortgage laws' flawed characterization of an immediately effective secur-
ity interest in rents as a conveyance of legal title insufficiently gives effect
to borrowers' and lenders' actual intentions. Current Texas law elevates
form over substance. 150 The UARA, therefore, would limit 'absolute' as-
signments of rents to the rare instance where a commercial real estate
owner transferred legal title to rents outside the context of a mortgage
loan agreement. The UARA's re-characterization of all assignments of
rents as a security interest has the effect of moving the decision-making
away from courts and toward the contracting parties.
2. Security Interest in Rents Implied by Statute
As previously stated, mortgagees almost always execute an assignment
of rents clause in their mortgage documents, or by separate agreement,
when financing a commercial real estate project. Commercial lenders
view rents as often "the only liquid asset which [they] can reach to sup-
plement or to avoid levying immediately upon the shrinking value that
the pledged security still retains." 151 The UARA simplifies this process
148. Uniform Assignment of Rents Act (UARA) § 4(b), § 4 cmt. 3 (2005). See also
Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents, supra note 8, at 36.
149. Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents, supra note 8, at 35.
150. Commentators have criticized the form over substance approach taken by Texas
mortgage law. See generally, Forrester, Still Crazy, supra note 14, at 101; Freyermuth,
Modernizing Security in Rents, supra note 8, at 29; Forrester, Rational Approach, supra
note 8, at 382-83; John C. Siemers, The Mortgagee's Lien Against Rents, 25 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 873, 892-97 (1994).
151. Comment, Mortgagee's Right to Rents after Default, supra note 10, at 1424.
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with a statutory presumption that a mortgage "creates an assignment of
rents arising from the real property described in the security instrument,
unless the security instrument provides otherwise."1 52 Given that secur-
ity interests in rents are common in commercial loan agreements, the op-
eration of UARA streamlines the loan agreement.
In residential loan agreements, however, assignments of rents are less
common. The drafters of the UARA comment that the UARA will have
"no systematic negative effects on residential mortgagors."'1 53 Usually a
mortgage on a residential property finances the purchase of the bor-
rower's primary residence and, thus, there would be no rents for the
lender to collect.' 5 4 The UARA commentary correctly posits, therefore,
that the assignment of rents created by the operation of section 4(a) is
irrelevant. 155
Of course, situations arise where the borrower not only resides in the
property but also rents a room to a tenant.156 In this instance, the draft-
ers of the Act are certain that the operation of section 4(a) still would not
have any negative effects because non-judicial enforcement of an implied
security interest in rents is not allowed under the UARA. 157 If the secur-
ity interest in rents exists only by operation of the Act, the mortgagee
would have to employ a judicial action for enforcement, such as an equi-
table receivership. 158 On the other hand, if the borrower, here renting a
room to a tenant, executed a loan agreement which expressly includes an
assignment of rents, then, both parties clearly contemplated enforcement.
Lastly, the UARA's statutory presumption that all enforceable security
instruments create an assignment of rents arising from the real property
described protects sellers under an installment land contract.' 59 An in-
stallment land contract ("ILK") is a mortgage substitute that operates
much like a third party loan except that the seller stands in the position of
the mortgagee. Generally, the purchaser will take possession of the prop-
erty at closing and agree to make monthly payments to the seller.1 60 The
drafters of the UARA recognize that "unsophisticated sellers" might exe-
cute a seller financing agreement without expressly taking an assignment
of rents in conjunction with the financing agreement.1 61 The operation of
152. UARA § 4(a).
153. UARA § 4 cmt. 1.
154. Id. The UARA comment to section 4 highlights the tenor of this article: assign-
ment of rents and the problems associated therewith are generally considered in the con-
text of commercial real estate deals.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. UARA §§ 8(d), 9(g).
158. See generally UARA § 7.
159. UARA §§ 2(14)-(15) (defining "security instrument" and "security interest"), 4
cmt. 1 (explaining that an ILK fits within the Act's definitions for security instrument and
security interest).
160. NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE, supra note 2, at 270-80.
161. The seller under an installment land contract "may have completed the transaction
without benefit of legal counsel and thus did not appreciate the need for a separate assign-
ment of rents." UARA § 4 cmt. 1.
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section 4(a) will adequately protect the seller-financer.
3. Public Policy Considerations
In 1981, the Texas Supreme Court limited lenders' access to rents be-
cause mortgagors retain possession and control of the mortgaged prop-
erty until foreclosure under lien theory rules. The ability of lenders to
collect rents under a security agreement was contrary, therefore, to the
basic mortgage law rules of the state. Also, the court questioned whether
a lender would apply rents to the mortgage debt if the loan agreement, as
typically drafted, did not affirmatively articulate this duty.
In contrast, the drafters of the 2005 UARA do not trust financially dis-
tressed mortgagors to apply rents to the mortgage debt. Owners of com-
mercial real estate probably lost favor with the courts during the market
crash in the 1980s. The overdevelopment and subsequent collapse of the
real estate market in Texas and across the country ruined businesses and
depressed real property values. In turn, the income stream of commercial
real estate projects dwindled; financially distressed mortgagors were
guilty of milking rents while in default on their mortgage loans. 162 As a
general observation, the fear that absolute assignments provide no assur-
ance that the lender will apply collected rents to the mortgage debt is
likely irrelevant in the event of default as the borrower is in arrears and,
more likely than not, the mortgagee would apply rents to the existing
debt.163
The drafters of the UARA, and the reporter, Freyermuth, in particular,
favor having a uniform, comprehensive, and national statute that governs
all aspects of assignments of rents, as would be the case if security inter-
ests in real property were subject to Article 9 of the U.C.C.164 Without a
legislative response, commercial lenders and borrowers suffer from un-
certainty in enforcement of an important matter in their loan agree-
ments-the collection and disbursement of rentals.' 65 In Texas, the Act
would all but eliminate litigation concerning the present semantics of col-
lateral and absolute assignments of rents, but in a practical sense, a na-
tionally recognized rule benefits Texas lenders. Given that commercial
real estate projects might take Texas entities to other parts of the country,
a uniform assignment of rents law would be greatly beneficial.
B. ENFORCEMENT METHODs ADOPTED UNDER THE UARA
Section 6 of the UARA, if adopted, would provide Texas mortgagees a
statutory entitlement for enforcement of assignments of rents against all
subsequent accruing rents until foreclosure. 66 In addition, sections 7, 8,
162. See generally Sandra Elzerman, Interests in Collaterally Assigned Rents and Profits
under the Bankruptcy Code, 22 Hous. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (1985).
163. See Comment, Mortgagee's Right to Rents after Default, supra note 10, at 1427.
164. See Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents, supra note 8, at 4.
165. Id. at 2-3.
166. See UARA § 6.
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and 9 of the Act enumerate remedial methods for enforcement while
specifying that such measures are in no way a mortgagee's sole and exclu-
sive remedies. 167 In fact, the UARA permits enforcement of security in-
terests in rents by any additional method recognized by Texas state
law. 168 For example, the UARA allows a mortgagee to enforce an assign-
ment of rents by obtaining possession of the underlying property pursu-
ant to Texas state law;169 the Act does not eliminate, however, the
mortgagee's responsibilities and liabilities to tenants and third parties. 170
Conversely, the UARA states that enforcement of an assignment of rents
under one of the "methods identified in Sections 7, 8, and 9... does not
make the assignee a mortgagee in possession of the real property. '1 71
1. Enforcement by Notification
The UARA empowers a mortgagee to enforce its assignment of rents
by notification to either the mortgagor 172 or tenants.173 In fact, the Act
provides a form in section 10 that "when properly completed, is sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of section 9."174 While Texas lenders cur-
rently enforce absolute assignments by sending notifications to the mort-
gagor or tenants, the Act's elimination of the formalistic distinctions
between a collateral and absolute assignment provides enforcement by
notification as a possible remedy for all mortgagees of commercial real
estate. 175 Of significant interest to commercial mortgagees in Texas is the
fact that rents collected by notification to either the mortgagor or tenant
do not necessarily need to be applied to "the payment of expenses of
protecting or maintaining the real property" unless the assignment agree-
ment indicates otherwise. 176
Notwithstanding the fact that section 4(a) of the UARA implies an as-
signment of rents in all mortgage agreements, a mortgagee cannot en-
force its security interests in rents by notification when the mortgagor
occupies the property as his primary residence. 177 Therefore, even if the
mortgagor leases a room to a tenant, he is still not subject to the mortga-
gee's enforcement powers under section 9 of the UARA if he too occu-
pies the property.178
167. UARA § 6(a) cmt.1.
168. See id.
169. See Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981).
170. UARA § 6 cmt. 1.
171. UARA § 11(1).
172. UARA § 8.
173. UARA § 9.
174. UARA § 10.
175. See generally UARA §§ 8(d), 9(g).
176. UARA § 13(a).
177. UARA § 8 cmt. 4.
178. UARA § 9 cmt. 7.
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2. Appointment of Receiver
The UARA would provide Texas lenders more certainty that they may
obtain the appointment of a receiver to enforce their assignment of rents
in the event of the mortgagor's default. Adoption of UARA section
7(a)(1)(A) would eliminate Texas courts' current equitable discretion
whether to enforce a receivership clause recited in the loan agreement. 179
Rather, the UARA "takes the position that a receivership clause is en-
forceable following the [mortgagor's] default. 1 80 Under section 7, a
Texas mortgagee may obtain its right to equitable receivership to enforce
its security interest in rents regardless of whether the receivership clause
is recited in the assignment of rents agreement or elsewhere in the loan
documents. 181 The UARA sets forth clear standards for when a mortga-
gee is entitled to a receiver. To obtain its equitable right to a receiver in
the event of a mortgagor's default, the mortgagee must prove one of the
following: the loan agreement contains a receivership clause, the mort-
gaged property is insufficient to satisfy the debt, the mortgagor is failing
to give rents to the mortgagee in violation of a provision of the UARA,
or a junior mortgagee has already diligently obtained a receiver. 182
The priority rule provided by UARA section 7 agrees with the current
Texas law. If a junior mortgagee obtains appointment of a receiver to
enforce a lien on the rents, pursuant to an assignment of rents agreement,
a senior mortgagee is allowed to intervene and enforce its superior inter-
est. 183 The senior mortgagee is only allowed, however, to collect rents
accruing after its intervention.184 The junior mortgagee in Texas will con-
tinue to be rewarded for "superior diligence" in "obtaining the appoint-
ment of a receiver for [its] benefit alone" if the UARA is adopted. 185
Under current law, Texas courts are allowed to appoint a receiver ex
parte in extraordinary circumstances. A mortgagee seeking appointment
without notice to the mortgagor must demonstrate to the court that a
"great emergency or imperative necessity" requires this equitable re-
lief.186 The drafters of the UARA allow state law to determine when, if
ever, the ex parte appointment of a receiver is allowed.187 For example,
in Texas civil courts in Dallas County, to carry its burden, a mortgagee
must show that "irreparable harm is imminent and there is insufficient
time to notify the opposing party or counsel."'1 88
179. See supra text accompanying notes 79.
180. UARA § 7 cmt. 4.
181. See id.
182. UARA § 7
183. Wood v. Fetzer, 19 S.W.2d 1113, 1114 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1929, writ ref'd).
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. Best Inv. Co. v. Whirley, 536 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no
writ) (citing Solomon v. Matthews, 238 S.W. 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1922, no writ)
for the proposition that appointment of ex parte receivers is to be made only in exceptional
and extreme situations).
187. UARA § 7 cmt. 7.
188. Dallas (Tex.) Civ. Dist. Ct. Loc. R. 2.02(b)(1).
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3. Waste of Rents and UARA
Citing Taylor v. Brennan with approval, the drafters of the UARA
agree that a lender may bring an action for damages for waste against a
mortgagor that pockets the rents after a properly enforced assignment of
rents. As stated in Part(II)(A)(5) above, the Texas Supreme Court recog-
nizes a mortgagee's action for waste when a mortgagor milks the rents, so
long as the mortgagee has taken the requisite affirmative steps to enforce
its security interest in the rentals.18 9 The Taylor holding was contingent
upon the finding that rents are a separate security from the underlying
real property, so damages are measured as the amount of rents collected
after default but not applied to the mortgage debt.'9 0 Generally, a mort-
gagee may only bring a suit for waste against the mortgagor if the dam-
aged property is no longer sufficient security for the debt. 191
The UARA agrees with the Taylor opinion and the Texas Supreme
Court on the issue of the rents being a "distinct source of collateral. '192
The drafters of the Act refused to follow the jurisdictions which hold that
postpetition rents are "'subsumed' within the valuation of the real prop-
erty itself." Rather, under the UARA, like Texas, "rents accruing prior to
the completion of a foreclosure constitute a source of collateral that is
distinct from the real property from which those rents accrued.' 93
The Act, however, diverges from the Taylor v. Brennan doctrine in that
a lender's remedies enumerated under the Act provide clear and simple
standards of enforcement. Under the Act, a lender may enforce what
Texas considers to be a collateral assignment of rents by mailing notices
to either the borrower or the borrower's tenants. Should the borrower
fail to remit rents, the lender's claim for waste of rents is actionable re-
gardless of the fact that Texas property law characterizes collateral as-
signments as inchoate liens.
4. Protection of Tenants and the UARA
The Texas legislature should adopt the UARA because it provides stat-
utory guidelines for enforcement of assignments of rents and protects the
expectations of tenants, which are affected by lenders' actions. For exam-
ple, even though section 9 of the UARA provides mortgagees with a rem-
edy of enforcement by notifying tenants, the drafters carefully qualify this
right by incorporating express rights to tenants. First, a mortgagee's en-
forcement of an assignment of rents by notification directly to a tenant is
189. Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 593-94 (Tex. 1981).
190. Heath, supra note 77, at 826.
191. Frio Inv., Inc. v. 4m-IRC/Rohde, 705 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1986, writ refd n.r.e.). The Fort Worth Court of Appeals pronounced that "a mortgagee is
entitled to the amount of the diminution of his security, and not necessarily the amount of
damage done to the property; because, where his security is still sufficient or his debt fi-
nally paid, he is not damaged." Wheeler v. Peterson, 331 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Ft. Worth 1960, writ dism'd).
192. See UARA § 4(b), cmt. 2.
193. UARA § 4 cmt. 2.
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subject to claims or defenses a tenant has under Texas law. 194 This provi-
sion contemplates, for example, that a tenant may refuse to pay rent if the
owner-mortgagor has failed to comply with an express provision in the
lease, such as a maintenance request. Second, the drafters anticipated a
situation where both a senior and junior mortgagee might attempt to en-
force its respective assignment of rents. 195 Given that there are two as-
signees, the Act protects the tenant from liability. If a tenant receives a
notification from a mortgagee to pay rents directly to it, the tenant is not
required to later pay a subsequent mortgagee that makes a request for
rents; instead, the tenant is allowed to continue paying the first mortga-
gee, in accordance with the notification first received, until that prior no-
tification is properly cancelled. 196 In fact, the Act protects tenants
against notifications sent in error. Should a tenant pay a mortgagee, the
mortgagor cannot hold the tenant liable for breach of its lease. 197 Lastly,
the UARA reasonably provides tenants time to consider the effect of a
notification they receive from a mortgagee attempting to enforce an as-
signment of rents. 198 Such a grace period gives tenants the opportunity to
speak with the owner-mortgagor, mortgagee, or their attorney.
Under section 13(a), if a mortgagee enforces its security interest in
rents by notification to either the mortgagor or tenant, it does not need to
apply those rents to the maintenance and operation of the real property.
Ever cognizant of tenants' rights, drafters of the UARA were aware that
failure to maintain the property may have negative effects on tenants.
Therefore, section 13(c) provides:
This [act] does not limit the standing or right of a tenant to request a
court to appoint a receiver for the real property subject to the assign-
ment or to seek other relief on the ground that the assignee's non-
payment of expenses of protecting or maintaining the real property
has caused or threatened harm to the tenant's interest in the prop-
erty. Whether the tenant is entitled to the appointment of a receiver
or other relief is governed by law of this state other than this [act]. 199
In general, the drafters gave consideration that tenants' rights may be
affected by an assignment of rents notwithstanding that they are not par-
ties to the agreement.
194. See UARA § 9(c).
195. UARA § 9(e).
196. UARA § 9(c)(3)-(4), (e)-(f).
197. UARA § 9(c)(3).
198. The Act provides that after tenant has "received a notification under [§ 9](a) is not
in default for nonpayment of rents accruing within 30 days after the date the notification is
received before the earlier of: (1) 10 days after the date the next regularly scheduled rental
payment would be due; or (2) 30 days after the date the tenant receives the notification."
UARA § 9(d).
199. UARA § 13(c).
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C. UARA-PERFECTING PERFECTION
The UARA sets clear standards for the perfection of assignments of
rents. The Act "remove[s] any lingering question regarding the enforce-
ability of a recorded assignment of rents" after the 1994 amendment to
section 552(b)(2). 20 0 Section 5(b) of the UARA, if adopted, would over-
rule the applicability of the Taylor v. Brennan doctrine to the postpetition
perfection of a security interest in rents as Congress thought it had al-
ready accomplished in 1994. The Act clearly distinguishes between
perfection of a security interest in rents, on the one hand, and enforce-
ment on the other.20 1 Section 5(b) of the Act provides that a security
interest in rents is perfected upon the recordation of the writing pursuant
to the state's recording statute notwithstanding the fact that the assign-
ment may be subject to conditions precedent, such as default, before the
mortgagee may enforce it.2°2
Smoothing out the additional wrinkle in the perfection dilemma of
what constitutes rents, the Act expressly defines the term as it operates
within the text of the Act.20 3 As previously explained, not all project
revenues are derived from a landlord-tenant relationship. But under cur-
rent Texas law, the fees paid by a licensee to a licensor do not constitute
rents. Remember that under Texas property law, hotel room rentals do
no constitute rent. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 expressly ad-
dressed the issue of hotel revenues by incorporating such rentals into the
security interest in rents. Nevertheless, Texas law governing the proper
characterization of rents still governs whether an assignment of rents may
reach post-petition revenue from entities such as a healthcare facility or
parking garage. The UARA provides six illustrations to address what
revenues constitute "rents" under the definition in section 2(12).204 In
addition to the regular landlord-tenant relationship, hotel room revenues
would also be rents under the Act.20 5 The drafters point out that revenue
from services such as the room service, however, would not constitute
rent, as it is not related to the lodger's right to occupy the room.
20 6
Lastly, the Act, by illustration, includes in its conception of rents fees
paid by a nursing home resident, marina fees, and parking garage fees.
207
As a sidelight, other problem areas exist in the context of bankruptcy,
given the nature of assignment of rents, but are outside the scope of this
Comment. For instance, creditors, both secured and unsecured, would
attempt to reach the debtor's estate in order to realize part, if not all, of
their respective debts. The UARA offers rules of priority for competing
mortgagees each holding an assignment of rents as well as disputes
200. Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents, supra note 8, at 29.
201. See supra pt. III(B)(2).
202. UARA § 5(b).
203. UARA § 2(12).
204. UARA § 2 cmt. 12.
205. UARA § 2 cmt. 12 illus. 2.
206. Id.
207. UARA § 2 cmt. 12 illust. 3, 4, 5.
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among mortgagees and secured creditors. 208
IV. CONCLUSION
During the initial stages of drafting, the Act was referred to as the Uni-
form Mortgagee Access to Rents Act.20 9 Commercial lenders' access to
rents is important because the rental stream is a distinct and separate
source of collateral to secure the mortgage obligation. Progressive states,
such as California, have passed statutes that require only recordation for
perfection of an assignment of rents; such statutes break with the com-
mon law rule now in effect in Texas. 210 The new UARA is a well-drafted
model law that creates a statutory lien on rents that is perfected once a
mortgagee executes and records its deed of trust.211 If adopted by Texas,
the Act would simplify state mortgage law and discard the burdensome
common law requirements adopted under Taylor v. Brennan. Because
perfection is a crucial issue after the mortgagor files for bankruptcy, the
UARA simplifies perfection and, therefore, limits trustees' (or debtors in
possession) ability to avoid a pre-petition lien on rents. Above all, Texas
should adopt the UARA because it emphasizes that any distinction be-
tween a collateral and absolute assignment is more semantic than real.
The Act should be adopted if only to eliminate the formalistic rules that
now require mortgagors to "convey" legal title to rents to lenders in or-
der to create an immediately enforceable security interest in rents.
208. See, e.g., UARA §§ 5(c), 15(b)-(d); Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents,
supra note 8, at 57-62; Debra J. Schnebel, Intercreditor and Subordination Agreements-A
Practical Guide, 118 BANKING L.J. 48, 50-53, 59-62 (2001). Section 510(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code mandates that bankruptcy courts enforce intercreditor agreements to the ex-
tent they would be enforceable contracts under state law. Schnebel, supra note 208, at 48.
209. Memorandum from Edward F. Lowry, Jr., supra note 13 (subject matter contained
in heading).
210. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 2938(a)-(b) (West 2006).
211. See UARA § 4(a). In 2007, the Uniform Assignment of Rents Act (2005) was
introduced by senate bill in two states-Connecticut and Idaho. S.B. 597, Gen. Assem.,
Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2007) (sponsored by Sen. Jonathan A. Harris, 5th Dist., and referred to
the Joint Committee on Judiciary); S.B. 1013, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2007) (passed
Feb. 1, 2007 and introduced to the House February 2, 2007).
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